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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of labor unemployment risk on corporate financing 
decisions.  Theory suggests that firms choose conservative financial policies partly as a 
means of mitigating worker exposure to unemployment risk.  Using changes in state 
unemployment insurance benefit laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by 
workers during layoff spells, we explore the connection between unemployment risk and 
the corporate financing decisions of public firms in the United States.  We find that 
increases in legally mandated unemployment benefits lead to increases in corporate 
leverage.  The impact of reduced unemployment risk on financial policy is especially 
strong for firms that have greater layoff separation rates, labor intensity, and financing 
constraints.  The estimated premium required to compensate workers for unemployment 
risk due to financial distress is about 57 basis points of firm value for a BBB-rated firm.  
These findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate 
financing decisions. 
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Workers bear significant costs during unemployment.  A large literature in labor economics 
focuses on unemployment risk as a substantial source of concern for workers, none the least because laid 
off workers often endure significant reductions in consumption (Gruber 1997), long delays before 
reemployment (Katz and Meyer 1990), and significant wage cuts after returning to work (Farber 2005; 
Gibbons and Katz 1991).  These costs are particularly evident amid the sustained high unemployment of 
the recent credit crisis and jobless recovery (e.g., Luo and Thee-Brenan 2009).  Workers’ concerns about 
becoming unemployed reduce labor demand even when a firm is far from bankruptcy, naturally affecting 
firms’ human resources policies on layoffs and wage setting (Topel 1983, 1984, Li 1986; Hamermesh and 
Wolfe 1990).  Despite their magnitude, however, workers’ costs of unemployment are largely absent from 
standard theories in corporate finance, which typically assume that labor markets are frictionless.   
This paper studies the impact of worker unemployment costs on corporate financing decisions.  
Specifically, we examine the hypothesis that firms choose conservative financial policies partly as a 
means of mitigating worker exposure to unemployment risk.1
Empirical identification of the impact of workers’ exposure to unemployment risk on corporate 
financing decisions is challenging for two reasons.  The first obstacle is to precisely measure workers’ 
exposure to unemployment risk.  The second difficulty is to distinguish the impact of worker 
unemployment costs from other factors which otherwise impact financial policy, such as unobservable 
investment opportunities.  Correlations between leverage and proxies for unemployment risk, such as firm 
size, capital intensity, and wages, are suggestive but open to many interpretations (Verwijmeren and 
Derwall 2010; Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang 2009).   
  Workers require that firms provide a 
premium in wages or benefits to compensate them for potential job loss (Topel 1984, Abowd and 
Ashenfelter 1981).  Firms can choose financial policies that decrease the risk of financial distress and 
costly layoffs, implicitly reducing the compensation required by workers to offset unemployment risk.  
Diminished exposure to unemployment risk through flexible financial policy is likely to be especially 
important in industries that experience relatively high layoff separation rates and tight financing 
constraints, as workers in these industries are more likely to experience job loss due to distress.  This 
hypothesis builds on theory by Titman (1984) and Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010). 
To overcome these challenges, we exploit changes in state unemployment insurance (UI) benefit 
laws, and examine their relation with the corporate financial policies of U.S. firms from 1950 to 2008.  
Increases in UI benefits impact corporate financing through their impact on workers’ exposure to 
unemployment risk.  More generous state unemployment benefits make layoffs less costly and reduce 
                                                 
1 As put by Stewart Myers, “To succeed a corporation requires a co-investment of financial capital from 
the outside and human capital that is built up inside the business…When you ask people to make an 
investment of human capital in your firm, you do not then do things – like raising the leverage ratio too 
high – that would needlessly put that investment at risk” (Myers et al. 1998, p.18-19).   
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workers’ demands to be compensated by their employers for facing high unemployment risk (Topel 
1984).  Because firms have less incentive to use conservative financial policy to reduce worker exposure 
to job loss, they are able to raise leverage and profit from increased debt tax shields and other benefits 
associated with debt financing.  
Our approach enables us to identify the impact of shocks to unemployment risk on corporate 
financial policies without requiring explicit measures of worker risk aversion to unemployment.  We 
make the (plausible) assumption that legally mandated increases in unemployment insurance payments 
lead to reductions in the costs workers face in unemployment, because unemployment benefits partially 
replace foregone earnings that result from default-induced unemployment.  This assumption is supported 
by a vast labor literature that finds theoretical and empirical support for the notion that unemployment 
insurance compensation is found to have economically meaningful effects on workers’ behavior and 
aggregate labor supply (e.g., Topel and Welch 1980; Topel 1984; Meyer 1990; Meyer 1995; Meyer and 
Mok 2007; Liu, Gormley, and Zhou 2010).  We further verify that changes making state UI benefit laws 
more generous are indeed associated with greater state UI payouts, suggesting that changes in legal 
mandated benefit allowances are suitable proxies for shocks to worker exposure to unemployment risk.   
Increases in the generosity of state unemployment insurance benefits are associated with 
increases in firm leverage and interest coverage ratios.  Doubling the maximum total UI benefit is 
associated with firms maintaining 4.1 percentage points greater average ratios of debt to assets and 15 
percent lower interest coverage.  These relations are empirically robust.  The inclusion of controls for firm 
and year fixed effects implies that the results reflect average within-firm changes in capital structure 
among firms when their state increases the generosity of its UI system, after accounting for concomitant 
national trends.  We include a variety of controls for firm financial characteristics and state economic 
conditions to ensure that the results are not driven by firm level variation in performance or 
macroeconomic factors.  We also show that the results are robust to various alternative measures of UI 
benefit generosity.  Furthermore, the relationship between UI benefits and leverage becomes even 
stronger when we exclude firms that have a geographically dispersed workforce for which we are likely to 
measure eligible UI benefits with error. 
We find that the relation between UI generosity and leverage is particularly stark for subsamples 
of firms that are distinguished by various labor market characteristics and worker attributes.  The relation 
is especially pronounced for firms in industries where workers face greater risk of unemployment, such as 
industries that experience frequent layoffs and industries with production technologies characterized by 
greater labor intensity.  Increases in UI benefits are likely to have larger effects in these firms because of 
the greater likelihood that workers will collect benefits due to industry-related layoff incidence.   
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We also find that the relation between UI payments and financing decisions is stronger for firms 
in industries that employ low wage employees and workers who are more likely to draw UI benefits.  
Because of liquidity constraints, UI benefits are likely to have a greater impact on low wage employees 
(Browning and Crossley 2001, Bloeman and Stancanelli 2005, Chetty 2008, Berk and Walden 2010).  
Additionally, workers vary in the speed with which they are able to secure reemployment after job loss, 
due to either heterogeneous search costs or firm specific human capital; workers who can quickly find 
employment after job loss often do not take up any UI benefits (Anderson and Meyer 1997).  Consistent 
with these ideas, we find that financing decisions in industries with many low wage workers and likely UI 
recipients are especially sensitive to changes in UI benefit laws. 
We also find a stronger relation between UI generosity and leverage among firms that face tighter 
financing constraints, as measured by low operating cash flows and the absence of dividend payments.  
Tight financing constraints make it difficult for firms to raise capital if they experience a negative shock, 
raising the probability that such firms must resort to cost cutting through layoffs or reductions in wages 
and benefits (Ofek 1993, John, Lang, and Netter 1992).  Workers in these firms therefore likely face 
greater unemployment risk, and increases in UI generosity should have a greater impact on the financial 
policies of these firms, as we document.  Collectively, this broad set of evidence is supportive of 
theoretical models which predict that firms choose conservative financial policies partly as a means of 
mitigating worker exposure to unemployment risk.   
We conduct a number of analyses to verify that our empirical framework identifies the causal 
impact of unemployment risk on corporate leverage.  An important possibility to consider is that local 
economic downturns could simultaneously lead to both states increasing UI benefits and firms increasing 
their borrowing.  In this scenario, the estimates may capture an endogenous relation rather than a causal 
effect of UI benefit changes on leverage.  Extensive empirical analysis, however, finds little support for 
this hypothesis.  First, controls for state unemployment rates and state GDP growth have minimal 
attenuating effect on our estimates; thus for an omitted variable to explain the results, the variable would 
have to be uncorrelated with these indicators of local economic health.  Second, the variable would also 
have to be correlated with various firm and industry characteristics for which we find a particularly strong 
relationship between UI benefits and leverage.  Third, we find that firms show no signs of unusually low 
operating profits or other signs of financial distress when benefits increase.  Fourth, we show that the 
financing decisions of firms which generate most of their revenue from national commerce and are hence 
less likely to be affected by local economic shocks exhibit large, if not larger, sensitivities to UI laws than 
firms which generate most of their sales from local, intrastate markets.  Fifth, as a falsification test, we 
show that bordering states’ UI benefit levels, which would also be affected by regional economic 
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conditions, are not correlated with firms’ leverage.  Additional tests, described below, also support a 
causal interpretation of the results.   
We also explore the empirical relevance of two alternative mechanisms that may explain the 
observed link between UI benefits and leverage.  One possibility is that increases in unemployment 
insurance benefits increase firms’ UI premiums and other costs, leaving them with less money to pay 
down debt; but when we examine the impact of increases in UI benefits on operating performance, we 
find evidence that increases in UI benefits are actually associated with positive, statistically insignificant 
changes in performance.  A second possibility is that unemployment insurance impacts the ability of 
unionized workers to bargain with management for higher wages, and that in response, firms choose 
aggressive financial policies to toughen their bargaining position.  We find, however, that the relation 
between UI generosity and financial policies is actually stronger for firms with low union coverage.  
Finally, we provide numerical estimates of the overall importance of unemployment risk for 
firms’ financing decisions.  UI benefits can provide substantial compensation to unemployed workers, but 
do not fully account for all costs borne by workers during layoff spells.  Using data on employment 
changes for firms in default and estimates from Topel (1984) on the size of compensation tied to 
unemployment risk, we estimate that the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment 
risk compensation are quite large: an average BBB-rated firm pays workers about 57 basis points of firm 
value to bear layoff risk due to financial distress.  For comparison, these costs explain nearly 90% of the 
difference between the tax benefits and risk-adjusted ex post costs of financial distress calculated by 
Almeida and Philippon (2007).  
The central contribution of this paper is to provide novel empirical evidence that worker 
unemployment risk significantly impacts firms’ corporate financial policies.  The findings indicate that 
managers choose financial policy partly as a means of mitigating labor’s exposure to unemployment risk, 
consistent with the predictions of models such as Titman (1984) and Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010).  
More broadly, the evidence suggests that frictions in labor markets affect corporate financial policies, a 
phenomenon of growing interest as human capital becomes an increasingly critical asset for firms 
(Zingales 2000).  This paper also adds to a growing literature analyzing the interactions between labor 
economics and finance (including Matsa 2010; Benmelech and Bergman 2009; Chen, Kacperczyk, and 
Ortiz-Molina 2010; Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin 2009).  While those papers tend to focus on the use of 
leverage as a strategic input in the bargaining process between workers and firms, our paper examines a 
unique channel through which financial policy is used to mitigate the costs borne by workers resulting 
from involuntary unemployment. 
Section 1 describes our theoretical framework.  Section 2 provides institutional background on 
unemployment insurance in the United States.  Section 3 describes the data and empirical framework. 
 5 
Section 4 presents the empirical findings, and Section 5 discusses alternative mechanisms.  Section 6 
provides estimates of the overall importance of unemployment risk for firms’ financing decisions, and 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
1. Theoretical framework 
Workers bear significant costs when they become involuntarily unemployed, including long 
delays before securing another job (Katz and Meyer 1990) and significant wage discounts when they 
eventually find reemployment (Farber 2005; Gibbons and Katz 1991).  These costs could result from 
costly job search (Diamond 1982; Mortensen 1986; Mortensen and Pissarides 1994), layoff 
discouragement effects (Jahoda 1982), a limited supply of match-specific job opportunities (Lazear 2003), 
imperfect information about worker productivity (Harris and Holmstrom 1982), or other labor market 
frictions.  Whatever the underlying causes, the impact of these unemployment costs on worker and firm 
behavior is significant and has been the subject of extensive study in labor economics.  Given the high 
costs of unemployment, a number of theoretical and empirical papers find that workers require 
compensation in the form of higher wages, additional benefits, or improved working conditions to 
compensate for unemployment risk, giving rise to what is commonly referred to as “compensating wage 
differentials.”  
The notion that wage differentials must compensate workers for bearing unemployment risk dates 
back to Adam Smith (1776/1976, p.120): 
“The wage of labor in different occupations vary with the constancy or inconstancy of 
employment.…What he earns, therefore, while he is employed, must not only maintain 
him while he is idle, but make him some compensation for those anxious and desponding 
moments which the thought of so precarious a situation must sometimes occasion.…The 
high wages of those workmen, therefore, are not so much the recompense of their skill, as 
the compensation for the inconstancy of their employment.”   
A number of papers formalize these ideas in theoretical models which collectively reach the conclusion 
that workers face non-trivial costs of job mobility that impose constraints on short run labor supply.  
Because firms cannot credibly commit to fully insure workers against these costs, firms must compensate 
workers ex ante to bear these risks (Abowd and Ashenfelter 1981; Topel 1984; Li 1986; Rosen 1986; 
Hamermesh and Wolfe 1990).  The risks – and thus the size of the compensation – increases with the 
probability of unemployment, the degree of worker risk aversion, the duration of job loss, and the costs 
incurred by workers during unemployment spells. 
A variety of empirical evidence based on worker micro data supports the importance of 
compensating wage differentials for unemployment risk.  Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981) find that 
compensating differentials for unemployment risk vary across industries and are  large – up to 14 percent 
of total wages – in the presence of significant unemployment risk.  Topel (1984) estimates that a 
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percentage point increase in anticipated unemployment raises an individual’s wage by about 1 percent in 
the presence of mean UI wage replacement, and by about 2.5 percent in the absence of any UI 
compensation.  Li (1986) and Hamermesh and Wolfe (1990) find that 14 to 41 percent of total inter-
industry wage differentials can be explained by differences in unemployment risk.   
Compensating wage differentials for unemployment risk are likely to affect firms’ optimal 
leverage ratios.  Financial leverage affects a firm’s probability of financial distress and hence workers’ 
exposure to layoff risk, as firms in distress are often forced to lay off workers in order to meet outstanding 
debt obligations (Ofek 1993; Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein 1994).  Increasing leverage can therefore 
increase the costs required to compensate workers for bearing greater exposure to the risk of financial 
distress and unemployment.   
These considerations can be understood as an additional term in the tradeoff weighed by firms 
when taking on additional leverage: 
 [ ] [ ] [ ] ExpenseLaborDistressFinancialofCostsNPVShieldTaxNPVIssueDebtNPV ∆++=  (1) 
In the traditional tradeoff theory of capital structure, a firm issuing debt balances the value obtained from 
debt tax shields with the potential value lost should the debt cause the firm to encounter financial distress 
(for example, see Graham 2000).  The present value of the costs of financial distress are the product of the 
probability of financial distress times the magnitude of ex post direct and indirect costs of distress, 
discounted at the appropriate discount rate (Almeida and Philippon 2007).   
The contribution of this paper is to provide empirical support for the inclusion of an additional 
term in the adjusted present value equation that typically characterizes the tradeoff theory of capital 
structure.  Because debt financing increases the probability of layoffs in distress, it also raises the 
compensation premium that workers require today to bear increased unemployment risk.  While costs of 
financial distress typically refer to ex post costs realized if the firm eventually becomes financially 
distressed, the final term in equation (1) represents costs paid ex ante due to labor market frictions.2
Taking on debt can lead workers to require higher wages even if workers do not directly observe 
financial leverage decisions.  The impact of leverage on unemployment risk is likely to be manifest in 
informative signals from coworkers, management, the business press, and other aspects of the economic 
environment.  In a recent paper, Hortascu, et al. (2010) find that auto dealers and customers respond to 
high-frequency fluctuations in manufacturers’ corporate distress risk; if customers can perceive such 
changes in distress risk, it is all the more likely that the firm’s employees perceive these changes as well.  
   
                                                 
2 Leverage may impose ex ante costs on the firm through the product market as well.  For example, 
Titman (1984) and Opler and Titman (1994) argue that high leverage potentially reduces sales of long-
lived goods because customers anticipating a bankruptcy liquidation expect higher costs of parts and 
servicing. 
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That compensating wage differentials do in fact respond empirically to unemployment risk further 
supports this conclusion (Abowd and Ashenfelter 1981; Topel 1984; Li 1986; Hamermesh and Wolfe 
1990). 
In the empirical analysis that follows, we examine changes in workers’ unemployment insurance 
benefits as shocks to the final term in equation (1): unemployment insurance benefits reduce the costs 
borne by workers during unemployment.  Because unemployment is less costly when workers are eligible 
for more generous UI benefits, they require a lower compensating differential per unit of layoff risk.  For 
example, Topel (1984) finds that unemployment insurance significantly reduces wage premiums for 
unemployment risk, and estimates that the full replacement of wages by UI payments would cause 
compensating wage premiums to decline to zero.  Reduced wage premia thus reduce the costs of debt 
issuance, and allow firms to raise leverage and gain from increased debt tax shields, lower managerial 
agency costs, and other benefits associated with debt financing.   
 
2. The unemployment insurance system in the United States 
The unemployment insurance system of the United States provides temporary income to eligible 
workers who become involuntarily unemployed and are willing and able to find alternative sources of 
employment.  Congress created the system as part of the Social Security Act of 1935, in response to the 
hardships of job loss experienced during the Great Depression. The Act created a national system of 
unemployment insurance but gave each State the autonomy to set many of the program’s parameters.  The 
joint federal-state structure has led to a system of unemployment insurance where the basic framework of 
insurance provision and administration is common throughout the country, yet there is substantial 
diversity among the States in taxable wage limits, tax rates, benefit eligibility, and benefit amounts.    
There are two primary purposes of unemployment insurance in the U.S. (Blaustein 1993).  First, 
unemployment insurance benefits are designed to help the individual worker maintain his living standards 
during unemployment and to facilitate his ability to find other work.  Second, in doing so, unemployment 
insurance benefits provide economic stability for the economy, particularly during recessions.  
The structure of the unemployment insurance system has not changed much over the last 75 
years, but there have been substantive changes in the benefits provided to workers by state governments.  
There are three key features of unemployment insurance benefits: eligibility, wage benefit amounts, and 
duration.  In order to receive unemployment insurance benefits, a worker must be eligible for benefits 
according to regulations passed by legislative bodies of the state in which he resides.  Typically, all 
private sector workers who are involuntarily unemployed and actively seeking new employment are 
eligible to receive benefits.  The wage benefit provided to an eligible worker by the unemployment 
insurance system is set according to formulas determined by state law.  A state’s wage benefit formula 
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typically calculates the highest earnings realized by the worker in 4 of the last 5 quarters, and seeks to 
replace approximately 50% of those wages through weekly payments, subject to minimum and maximum 
bounds. There is some variation both across states and over time (within states) in the formulas used to 
calculate the benefits, but most of the variation comes from changes to the maximum bounds.  States also 
set the duration (i.e., the number of weeks) for which the claimant is eligible to receive the weekly benefit 
payment as long as he is still unemployed and looking for work.  There is also variation across states and 
over time in the number of weeks for which a claimant is eligible to receive UI benefits.   
The funds used to finance unemployment insurance provisions come from taxes assessed on 
eligible firms in the United States.  Currently, almost all firms that employ at least one worker for 20 
weeks and maintain minimal levels of base wage payments are subject to unemployment insurance taxes.  
Tax rates are “experience rated,” that is, firms that have a greater propensity to lay off workers (and thus 
draw more benefits) pay higher tax rates.  These taxes are aggregated at the federal and state levels to 
finance UI programs.  When a claimant files for UI benefits, payments are first made by state 
governments; when states exhaust their resources or hit certain rates of aggregate unemployment, they are 
eligible to tap federal funds for additional support. 
As explained by Blaustein (1993), various factors lead to variation in unemployment insurance 
benefits across states and over time.  The political process, including political party preferences, lobbying, 
and logrolling, plays a dominant role in establishing the generosity of benefits.  Popular social trends in 
conservatism versus progressivism also affect the outlook of statutory bodies.  Economic factors also play 
a role; for example, the degree of a state’s industrial urbanization, underlying trends in unemployment 
rates, and higher average wage levels are thought to lead states to provide more generous benefits. 
UI benefits have a substantial impact on unemployed workers.  Gruber (1997) finds that 
unemployment insurance provides significant consumption smoothing benefits to workers; in the absence 
of unemployment insurance, he estimates that consumption would fall by one-third.  Liu, Gormley, and 
Zhou (2010) find that unemployment insurance impacts workers’ personal savings and investment 
decisions.  Increases in unemployment insurance benefits also affect workers’ searches for new 
employment and the durations of their unemployment spells (Topel and Welch 1980; Meyer 1990; Meyer 
1995; Meyer and Mok 2007).  The impact of UI benefits on unemployed workers, in turn, also appears to 
have significant effects on firms.  For example, managers are more willing to layoff workers when 
benefits improve and workers face lower costs of unemployment (Topel 1983).     
Changes in the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits thus provide meaningful shocks to 
the cost to workers of being laid off.  We use these shocks, which feature substantial heterogeneity across 
states and over time, to examine whether firms account for workers’ exposure to unemployment risk in 
setting financial policies.  Variation in unemployment insurance laws affects workers’ expected outcomes 
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in unemployment without directly impacting the firm itself, thus providing a clean setting to examine the 
relationship between financial policy and workers’ exposure to unemployment risk.   
 
3. Data and empirical framework 
Raw data suggests that worker unemployment costs affect firm financial policy.   Figure 1 shows 
the industry-level correlation between layoff propensities and market leverage ratios.  The worker layoff 
separation rates are long-run averages from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’s Mass Layoff Statistics 
(described in more detail below) and average market leverage is from Compustat for 2008.  The graph 
shows a negative relationship between layoff propensities and leverage.  The negative relation is 
consistent with greater layoff propensities exposing workers to greater unemployment risk, which in turn 
causes managers in these industries to choose conservative financial policies to protect workers from 
unemployment. Similarly, Titman and Wessels (1988) find a positive correlation between voluntary 
employees’ quit rates and firms’ leverage ratios; they conclude that low costs of job loss lead to greater 
voluntary unemployment and allow firms to increase debt financing.  
It is possible, however, that the statistical relationships between layoffs, quit rates, and capital 
structure do not actually reflect causal relationships; high industry volatility, for example, may lead to 
both high layoff propensities and conservative financial policies.  To more precisely measure and identify 
the impact of worker unemployment costs on financial policy, we collect data on state unemployment 
insurance benefit laws and firm balance sheet characteristics.  Our information on unemployment 
insurance benefits is obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Significant Provisions of State UI 
Laws from 1950 through 2008.  These annual publications detail the UI benefit schedules in each U.S 
state.  Under each system, eligible claimants receive a weekly benefit payment for a set number of weeks, 
where the benefit amount and duration are determined by the worker’s employment history during a base 
period.  To measure the generosity of each state’s UI system, we focus on the product of the maximum 
benefit amount and the maximum duration allowed.3
 Summary statistics describing the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits are presented 
in Table 1.  Log max weekly benefit is the log maximum weekly wage benefit allowance given to workers 
in an average state-year; the average log wage benefit, unadjusted for inflation, is 5.2 (approximately 
  The results are robust to other specifications for the 
generosity of the benefit criteria. 
                                                 
3 Much of the empirical research on UI generosity examines variation across individual workers in the 
ratio of the weekly UI benefit to weekly wages, called the “wage-replacement ratio.”  Although the wage-
replacement ratio derives naturally from theoretical models of job search, it varies relatively little either 
across state programs or over time (Moffitt and Nicholson 1982).  Because our study focuses on 
differences in UI across firms (and we lack employer-employee linked data), we rely on characteristics of 
UI generosity that display significant variation empirically across states and over time.  Because these 
provisions have proven more flexible in practice, they are also more directly relevant to policymakers. 
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$186 per week).   Log max duration is the log maximum number of weeks that a state provides 
unemployment insurance benefits to claimants; the average sample state-year amount is 3.3 
(approximately 26 weeks).  Log max total benefit, the log of the maximum number of weeks times the 
maximum weekly benefit amount, provides a proxy for the total unemployment insurance benefits that a 
UI claimant can receive in a given year (U.S. Congress 2004). Unadjusted for inflation, the average log 
max total benefit is 8.5 (approximately $4,876 per year).  There is also significant variation across states; 
in 2009, for example, the maximum annual total benefit varies from about $6,000 in Mississippi to more 
than $28,000 in Massachusetts. 
 The evolution of state UI benefits over time is depicted graphically in Figures 2 and 3.   Figure 2 
illustrates relative increases in state maximum unemployment insurance benefits by decade.  Each map 
corresponds to a different decade and displays the quartile of each state’s increase in UI generosity, where 
darker shading indicates larger increases in UI benefits.  This is the type of variation in UI generosity that 
we exploit in the analysis below.  States display significant heterogeneity in relative UI benefit trends 
across decades, and within decades, the variation does not appear to be caused by regional trends.  The 
changes in UI benefits are not dominated by a specific group of states, as at some point in time all states 
experience large changes in UI benefit laws relative to their peers.  Figure 3 plots the distribution of the 
absolute magnitude of the changes in state UI benefit laws over each decade.  States typically increase 
their UI generosity by 25 to 75 percent over a decade, and much larger increases, such as more than 
doubling maximum total benefits, are not uncommon.   
There is no indication that states changes UI benefit laws at that same time that they adopt other 
laws that impact corporate borrowing.  To explore a possible connection, we compare changes in UI 
generosity to changes in state corporate income tax rates, perhaps the most important driver of firms’ 
leverage choices.  We obtain historical data on states’ highest marginal corporate income tax rate from the 
U.S. Tax Foundation for the years 2000 to 2009.  Although the tax rate and log max total benefit display 
similar amounts of variation across states and over time, the partial correlation between the series, after 
accounting for state and year fixed effects, is only -0.0089 (p ≥ 0.850).  The changes in these laws appear 
to be unrelated.   
The measures of UI generosity that we construct are reflected in the aggregate realized value of 
unemployment insurance benefits paid out by states.  Using annual data on state UI payments from 1969 
(the earliest year available) through 2008 from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) Regional 
Economic Accounts, we regress log total UI compensation on the benefit criteria described above, as well 
as controls for macroeconomic conditions and state and year fixed effects.  The results, reported in Table 
2, indicate that the elasticity of maximum total benefits to actual compensation payments is 
approximately 0.9.  Aggregate payouts are also correlated with states’ maximum weekly benefit amounts 
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and maximum duration periods.  The correlations are statistically significant and economically 
meaningful, and robust to controls for macroeconomic conditions, as represented by the state 
unemployment rate (available from the Current Population Survey since 1977) and the GDP growth rate 
(from the BEA). 
These results complement a large literature in labor economics documenting the effects of 
unemployment insurance benefits on the behavior of eligible individuals.  Studies show that increases in 
unemployment insurance benefits significantly affect the duration of workers’ unemployment spells (for 
examples, see Moffitt 1985; Meyer 1990; Katz and Meyer 1990; Card 2004).  Combined with our 
findings about aggregate payouts, these results strongly suggest that the unemployment insurance laws 
that we examine in this paper provide substantial assistance to laid-off workers. 
 To analyze the impact of worker unemployment costs on firms’ financial policies, we combine 
our measures of the generosity of states’ unemployment insurance systems with firms’ balance sheet and 
income statement information from Compustat.  The sample includes all firms (excluding financials and 
utilities) with nonmissing observations, which amounts to about 14,000 firms and 140,000 firm-years 
over the 1950 through 2008 period.  The financial data are winsorized at 1 percent tails, and summary 
statistics are reported in Table 1.  The ratio of debt to the market value of assets for the average firm is 29 
percent.   
We use panel regression analysis to examine the connection between UI generosity and financial 
policy at the firm-year level.  We estimate a typical leverage regression (Rajan and Zingales 1995), and 
include the generosity of the UI system of the state where the firm is located as an additional regressor.4
ijtDEBT
  
Specifically, let  be a measure of financial leverage at firm i  in state j  and year t , and 
ijtVALUE  represent the market value of the firm.  We then regress 
 isttiistst
ist
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DEBT
εωνβα ++++)  (= 1 , (2) 
where the level of debt as a fraction of the firm’s total value is modeled as a function of the log of the 
maximum annual unemployment insurance benefit (as defined above), a set of controls itX , firm fixed 
effects iν , and year fixed effects tω .  The controls include the financial variables commonly included in 
leverage regressions, namely the proportion of fixed assets (a proxy for potential collateral), the market-
to-book ratio (investment opportunities), log sales (firm size), modified Altman’s z-score (probability of 
                                                 
4 Firms are assigned to a state based on the company’s headquarters location.  If some of a firm’s plants 
are located in a different state than the firm’s headquarters, then those plants would be subject to a 
different legal regime.  Such mismeasurement may attenuate the results.  When we exclude industries 
likely to have a more dispersed workforce (reported below), the magnitude of the estimates increase. 
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bankruptcy), and return on assets (profitability).5 1α  The firm fixed effects ensure that estimates for  
reflect actual changes in benefit generosity and leverage over time rather than simple cross-sectional 
correlations, and the year fixed effects account for transitory economy-wide factors such as aggregate 
macroeconomic conditions that could possibly affect both variables.  The term itX  also includes the state 
unemployment rate and the state GDP growth rate to control for contemporaneous local macroeconomic 
conditions.  Summary statistics for these variables are also presented in Table 1.  The estimated standard 
errors in all regressions are corrected for clustering at the firm level. 
 
4. Findings 
4.1. Unemployment insurance generosity and corporate borrowing 
The reduced-form relationship between unemployment insurance benefits and leverage is 
depicted graphically in Figure 4.  The graph presents the variables’ deviations from annual averages in the 
full-sample to account for aggregate time trends.  The results are reported for the 6 U.S. states with the 
most Compustat firms. The figure shows a positive relationship between UI benefit generosity and 
leverage.  The comovement of UI benefits and market leverage is striking, even as different states display 
vastly different trends in unemployment insurance benefits.  
Regression analysis of the relation between the generosity of unemployment insurance laws and 
corporate borrowing confirm these results.  The estimates, reported in Table 3, show that increases in UI 
benefit generosity are associated with increases in financial leverage.  The relationship is economically 
meaningful and statistically significant: doubling the maximum total UI benefit is associated with 4.1 
percentage points greater average leverage (column 1).  Controls for firm and year fixed effects ensure 
that these results reflect average within-firm changes in capital structure among firms when their state 
increases the generosity of its UI system, after accounting for concomitant national economic conditions 
and leverage trends. The findings are robust to including financial controls (column 2) and 
macroeconomic conditions (column 3).   
Workers are covered by the UI regime in the state where they work, whereas our empirical design 
measures the UI laws where their employer is headquartered.  This disconnect may attenuate our 
estimates if some of a firm’s workers are located in a different state than the firm’s headquarters.  To 
address this issue, we reestimate equation (2) after excluding industries where a large percentage of the 
                                                 
5 These variables reflect the literature on capital structure, surveyed in Harris and Raviv (1991), and the 
variables included in cross-sectional analysis in Rajan and Zingales (1995).  The modified Altman’s z-
score is 
 
assets total
capital working1.2
assets total
earnings retained1.4
assets total
sales1.0
assets total
EBIT3.3 +++  
(MacKie-Mason (1990)). 
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workforce is likely to be geographically dispersed, namely retail, wholesale, and transport.  As expected, 
excluding these industries increases the estimate of 1α  by about a third to 4.1 percentage points (column 
4).  The results are also robust to using book (instead of market) leverage, although the estimate is slightly 
reduced (column 5).6
These estimates are economically meaningful.  The coefficient estimates for the financial control 
variables provide benchmarks for the magnitude of 
 
1α .  Doubling the maximum total UI benefit has a 
similar relationship with total leverage as increasing the proportion of fixed assets by 14 percentage 
points or doubling sales.  Given that UI generosity varies by a factor of almost five between the most and 
least generous states, these magnitudes suggest that UI is quantitatively important in explaining average 
leverage.  Furthermore, if firms face significant adjustment costs in changing their leverage in response to 
changes in worker unemployment risk, then the estimated regression coefficients likely understate the full 
impact of unemployment risk on capital structure (Leary and Roberts 2005, Strebulaev 2007).  
The value of the tax shield associated with the additional leverage provides another estimate for 
the economic magnitude of the relation.  Based on the estimate from column (3), doubling the maximum 
total UI benefit is associated with 3.0 percentage points greater average leverage.  If the average firm 
faces an interest rate of 10 percent and marginal tax rate of 25 percent (Graham, Lemmon, and 
Schallheim 1998), then the incremenal tax shield totals approximately 0.08 percent of the firm’s assets’ 
value: 
3.0% increase in debt/assets * 10% interest rate * 25% marginal tax rate = 0.08% 
For example, for a $2 billion firm, this amounts to $1.5 million.  In 2008, the average Compustat firm had 
$245,000 in asset value per employee.  Thus the value of the incremenal tax shield associated with 
doubling the maximum total UI benefit amounts to about $185 per employee for the average firm (i.e., 
0.075% * $245,000 = $185). Although this calculation is only approximate (for example, it may be an 
overestimate because it ignores costs of financial distress), it provides an estimate for the additional 
wages and benefits workers require to work for a firm with 3.0 percentage points greater average 
leverage. 
Although much of the academic literature on leverage focuses on the debt-to-asset ratio, for 
workers worried about their firm becoming distressed, the most important measure of the firm’s financing 
policy is perhaps its interest coverage.  Interest coverage (the ratio of operating earnings before 
depreciation to interest expense) measures the firm’s ability to use its current profits to cover the interest 
                                                 
6 Further analysis suggests the relation between UI generosity and market leverage is indeed driven by 
increases in debt levels rather than decreases in market values.  Estimating equation (1) with log debt as 
the dependent variable, rather than with leverage ratios, finds that doubling the maximum total UI benefit 
is associated with a 21 percent increase in total borrowing (t = 4.2). 
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payments due on its outstanding debt.  Measuring leverage by interest coverage ratios instead of debt 
ratios can lead to very different conclusions when a firm is expected to grow.  Firms whose cash flows are 
expected to grow can appear to have low leverage when measured on a debt-to-asset ratio basis (debt is 
low relative to future expected cash flows), but high leverage when measured on an interest coverage 
basis (required interest payments are large relative to current cash flows).  
The relation between UI benefit criteria and firms’ interest coverage is presented in Table 4.  
Following Faulkender and Petersen (2006), we examine interest coverage in logs to account for the 
relatively greater importance of changes for low levels of interest coverage.7
Across all of the specifications reported in Tables 3 and 4, we find significant associations 
between changes in unemployment insurance benefit criteria and firms’ financing policies.  Firms appear 
to increase total debt as a fraction of assets and maintain lower interest coverage when workers are 
eligible to receive higher benefits from state governments during unemployment.  The empirical findings 
are consistent with the theory that firms boost their financial leverage when workers are better insulated 
from unemployment risk.   
  As with the debt-to-asset 
ratio, we find that when workers are eligible for greater benefits if unemployed, firms increase their 
leverage by maintaining less interest coverage (i.e., they have higher interest expense per dollar of 
earnings).  The results are both economically and statistically significant: doubling the maximum total UI 
benefit is associated with firms maintaining 15 percent lower interest coverage (column 1).  The estimates 
are robust to including financial controls (column 2) and measures of local macroeconomic conditions 
(column 3).  Excluding industries where a large percentage of the workforce is likely to be geographically 
dispersed increases the estimate’s magnitude  to −18 percent (column 4).  All of these results for interest 
coverage are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
4.2 Identification analysis 
One possible alternative explanation for the findings is that poor local economic conditions, such 
as high unemployment, lead both states to adopt more generous UI laws and firms to increase their 
borrowing, implying that there may not necessarily be a causal relationship between UI benefits and 
financial leverage.  We explore the empirical relevance of this hypothesis in several ways.  First, we 
include controls for local macroeconomic conditions, namely the state unemployment rate and state GDP 
growth rate, and find that the inclusion of these controls has minimal effects on estimates of the 
                                                 
7 For example, an increase in coverage from 100 to 101 is not as meaningful as an increase from 1 to 2.  
Following Faulkender and Petersen (2006), we code interest coverage equal to zero when earnings are 
negative (the ratio is otherwise not well defined) and take the log of one plus interest coverage as the 
variable of interest. The log transformation also has the advantage of making the distribution more 
symmetric. 
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association between UI benefits and leverage (see column 3 of Tables 3 and 4).  An omitted variable that 
explains the results would have to be uncorrelated with these indicators of local economic conditions. 
Second, we estimate heterogeneity in the effect across numerous dimensions, and again find 
patterns consistent with a causal relationship.  These heterogeneity analyses are presented below in 
Sections 4.3 though 4.5.  An omitted variable that explains the results would also have to be correlated 
with all of the various industry, worker, and firm characteristics for which we find a particularly strong 
relationship between UI benefits and leverage.  
Third, we point out that although most Compustat firms have relatively localized production 
facilities, the revenues of these large, publicly traded firms are typically spread across the country or the 
world.  For such firms with national product markets, idiosyncratic changes in the economic conditions of 
the local areas in which they produce are unlikely to have much effect on their borrowing.  Changes in 
national economic conditions will affect the demand for their goods which are sold nation- or worldwide, 
but these are captured by the year fixed effects.   
To evaluate the extent to which local economic shocks may be impacting our results, we gather 
data from the 2007 U.S. Commodity Flow Survey to distinguish firms based on the fraction of total 
revenues realized from intrastate versus interstate transactions.  If changes in UI laws are driven 
exclusively by changes in local economic conditions, then the relation between the laws and corporate 
borrowing should be greatest for firms which generate most of their sales from local, intrastate commerce.  
In Table 5, we present regression estimates of the relation between log max UI benefits and firm 
financing across samples of firms stratified by the fraction of industry sales that are generated from out-
of-state consumers.  The results cast doubt on the importance of residual, omitted local economic shocks 
driving the coefficient estimates.  We find that the relation between UI generosity and corporate 
borrowing is as large, if not larger, when a high fraction of sales are generated out-of-state.  Even when 
the sample is restricted to industries with more than 85 percent of sales generated out-of-state, max total 
UI benefits are associated with a 5.4 percentage point increases in leverage (Panel A, column 6) and a 30 
percent reduction in interest coverage (Panel B, column 6).  
Fourth, we examine firms’ profits and find no signs of poor operating performance when benefits 
increase.   Regression estimates of the relation between log max UI benefits and return on assets are 
reported in Table 6.  Estimates in column 1 control for only firm and year fixed effects, those in column 2 
add controls for the various firm financial characteristics, column 3 also includes controls for local 
macroeconomic conditions, and column 4 excludes industries with relatively dispersed workforces.   
Across all four specifications, the level of UI benefits has no significant relation to firms’ operating 
performance.  If anything, the point estimates suggest that increases in UI benefits may be associated with 
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increases in operating performance.8
Fifth, we undertake a falsification test whereby we examine the relation between firms’ capital 
structures and the generosity of the UI systems in neighboring states.  To the extent that a firm’s 
operations are concentrated in its headquarter’s state, the generosity of UI benefits in neighboring states 
should have no direct effect on the firm.  However, if heterogeneity in regional economic conditions 
(orthogonal to our controls for state unemployment and GDP growth) affect UI benefit laws in the firm’s 
state, then benefit laws in bordering states are likely to be affected as well.  In this scenario, including 
bordering states’ benefit criteria as additional controls in equation (2) would reduce estimates of 
  These results contradict the notion that poor economic conditions 
lead firms to increase their bargaining at the same time that UI benefits improve. 
1α .  To 
the contrary, the results reported in Table 7 find that our estimates of the relation between UI laws and 
firms’ borrowing are unaffected by these controls.  For both leverage (columns 1 and 2) and interest 
coverage (columns 4 and 5), the coefficient on log max total benefit is the same with and without controls 
for bordering states’ UI benefits.  Furthermore, even when we exclude controls for the generosity of 
benefits in the firm’s home state, the relation between bordering states’ benefits and leverage is relatively 
small and statistically insignificant; for interest coverage, the estimate suggests the relation is only one-
sixth as large as 1αˆ  (column 6). We conclude that the relation between home UI benefits and financing 
decisions do not appear to be driven by an omitted regional economic shock. 
Sixth, the results are robust to using other measures of UI generosity.  During periods of high 
unemployment, it is not uncommon for states (or the federal government) to adjust UI benefits by 
increasing the duration over which benefits can be drawn. The basic “extended benefits” program, which 
was enacted by Congress in 1970, provides up to 13 additional weeks of benefits when a state is 
experiencing high unemployment.9
                                                 
8 Furthermore, the coefficients weakly increase in absolute magnitude as more control variables are added 
to the regression, suggesting that the lack of a negative estimated coefficient does not stem from empirical 
misspecification or omitted variable bias.   
  During these extensions, the criteria for weekly benefit amounts are 
not affected.  To minimize concerns about omitted variables, we deliberately exclude these extended 
benefits from our calculations of maximum duration or total potential benefits used in this paper.  
Nevertheless, it is possible that even some permanent changes in benefit duration may be motivated by 
local economic shocks, so we separately examine the associations with leverage of weekly benefit 
allowances and benefit durations.  Table 8 shows the correlation between maximum weekly benefits or 
maximum duration and financial leverage after controlling for financial covariates and macroeconomic 
indicators.  Of the four estimates shown, all are sizable in magnitude and three are statistically significant 
9 Some states have also adopted a voluntary program to pay up to 7 additional weeks of extended benefits 
during periods of extremely high unemployment. 
 17 
at conventional confidence levels.  Both weekly benefit levels and benefit duration are strongly correlated 
with firms’ financing policies. 
 
4.3 Importance of labor market characteristics 
Theory suggests that increases in UI benefits impact corporate financing decisions through their 
effects on workers’ exposure to unemployment risk.  Because workers face non-trivial costs from 
unemployment, they require a compensating premium in wages unless firms choose conservative 
financial policies that reduce the risk of financial distress and layoffs.  More generous state 
unemployment benefits make layoffs less costly for workers and enable managers to attract workers even 
with higher leverage.  Under this model, we would thus expect to find a stronger relationship between UI 
benefits and corporate financial policies in industries that are more likely to be affected by labor 
unemployment risk.  This section evaluates this hypothesis by separately examining industries with 
varying propensities to layoff workers and industries with production technologies of varying labor 
intensity.  
 Historically, layoffs are much more common in some industries than others.  Differences in the 
long-run propensity for layoffs likely result from structural differences, such as the variability of demand 
and flexibility of production technologies.  We calculate layoff propensities at the three-digit NAICS 
industry level using data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’s Mass Layoff Statistics for 1996 
through 2008.  We count the number of workers being separated from their jobs during extended mass 
layoffs, defined by the BLS as when at least 50 initial claims are filed against an establishment during a 
consecutive 5-week period and at least 50 workers have been separated from their jobs for more than 30 
days.  For each industry-year, we take the ratio of such separations to total industry employment (from the 
BEA), and then obtain the industry layoff separation rate by taking the simple average of these ratios over 
the full sample period.   
A listing of the layoff separation rate in each industry is presented in Appendix Table A1.  The 
average layoff separation rate is 1.5 percent (median is 0.8 percent), subject to substantial variation across 
industries.  Separation rates are less than 0.1 percent in seven industries including real estate, various 
health care services, and auto parts dealers; the highest separation rates are in agriculture and forestry 
support activities (18.4 percent), passenger ground transportation (5.9 percent), and heavy construction 
(5.7 percent).   
To exploit variation in the probability of layoffs across industries, we divide our main sample of 
firms into two groups based on whether their industry’s layoff separation rate is above or below the 
sample median.  Then we repeat our analysis of UI generosity and leverage separately for each group of 
firms.  The results are reported in Table 9. 
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We find that the relation between maximum total UI benefits and firms’ financial leverage is 
statistically significant only in the sample with high layoff separation rates.  Point estimates are at least 
twice as high when layoff propensities are high, compared to when they are low.  Doubling the maximum 
total UI benefit is associated with a 4.1 percentage point increase in leverage in industries facing a high 
probability of layoffs (p < 0.05; column 1), compared to a 1.7 percent increase (statistically insignificant) 
in low layoff industries (column 5).  Similarly, doubling the maximum total UI benefit is associated with 
a 21.8 percent reduction in interest coverage in industries with a high probability of layoffs (p < 0.01; 
column 2), compared to a 4.2 percent decrease (statistically insignificant) in low layoff industries (column 
6).  Consistent with theory, the findings indicate that the relation between UI generosity and firm financial 
policy is especially strong when workers face greater layoff risk.  
UI benefits are also more likely to affect financing decisions among firms that are more labor 
intensive.  Financial leverage increases the probability of layoffs and the compensation required by each 
individual worker to bear unemployment risk.  The aggregate labor-related costs resulting from increased 
leverage grow when firms are more labor intensive, because unemployment risks and the associated 
compensation levels are multiplied across a greater number of workers.  Managers of firms which rely 
heavily on human capital in the production process are thus more likely to take account of worker 
unemployment costs when making financing decisions.  We measure labor intensity by the ratio of labor 
and pension expense to sales.  Using Compustat data, we calculate the average labor intensity in 3-digit 
NAICS industries among firms that report their labor costs, and then divide our main sample of firms into 
two groups based on whether their industry’s labor intensity is above or below the sample median.  
Finally, we repeat our analysis of UI generosity and leverage separately for each group of firms.  The 
results are reported in Table 9. 
We find that the impact of UI benefits on financing decisions of firms with above-median labor 
intensity is economically large and statistically significant.  Doubling the maximum total UI benefit is 
associated with a 3.7 percentage point increase in leverage and a 20 percent reduction in interest coverage 
in labor intensive industries (columns 3 and 4).  In contrast, the relation between UI benefits and firm 
financing is smaller and statistically insignificant in industries with below median labor intensity 
(columns 7 and 8).  The findings illustrate that the link between UI benefits and firm financing decisions 
is particularly evident in industries where workers are an especially important component of the firm’s 
production process. 
 
4.4 Importance of worker characteristics 
We also test whether the relation between unemployment insurance and firms’ financing 
decisions is stronger in industries with worker characteristics that are likely to make unemployment 
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insurance especially important.  Because of liquidity constraints, unemployment is particularly costly for 
workers with limited savings.  Browning and Crossley (2001) and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005) find 
that the consumption smoothing benefits of UI are concentrated wholly among individuals who have no 
assets at the time of job loss; and Chetty (2008) concludes that 60 percent of the increase in 
unemployment durations caused by UI benefits is due to liquidity constraints rather than distortions in 
marginal incentives to search.  Low wage workers may also have a greater demand for unemployment 
insurance because of their limited participation in capital markets (Berk and Walden 2010).  UI benefits 
are thus more likely to affect financing decisions in firms where many workers receive low wages, as 
lower wage workers are likely to have smaller savings and are especially vulnerable to liquidity 
constraints after job loss.   
We empirically test whether the impact of UI benefits on firm financing decisions is stronger for 
industries with high fractions of low wage workers.  Using the 2000 U.S. Population Census, we calculate 
the percentage of workers in each 3-digit NAICS industries with less than $40,000 in annual income, and 
then divide our main sample of firms into two groups based on whether their industry is above or below 
the sample median for low wage workers.  We again repeat our analysis of UI generosity and leverage 
separately for each group of firms.  The results are reported in Table 10. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, the relationship between UI benefits and leverage is concentrated 
among industries with a high proportion of low wage workers. Doubling the maximum total UI benefit is 
associated with a 4.2 percentage point increase in leverage and an 18.1 percent reduction in interest 
coverage in industries with above median low wage workers (columns 1 and 2).  In contrast, the relation 
between UI benefits and firm financing decisions is smaller in industries with fewer low wage workers, 
although the estimate for interest coverage is statistically significant (columns 5 and 6).   
UI benefit levels are also more likely to affect financing decisions in industries where workers 
more frequently claim benefits when they become unemployed.  The speed with which workers are able 
to secure reemployment after a layoff varies across industries, perhaps due to heterogeneous search costs 
or because some workers face limited demand for their specific skills and human capital.  Furthermore, 
when workers regain employment after a layoff, they are no longer eligible for benefits, and many 
workers who expect to find employment quickly often do not take up benefits at all (Anderson and Meyer 
1997).  Firms whose workers are likely to claim UI benefits when they are laid off are thus likely to be 
especially sensitive to changes in UI laws when making financing decisions.  
To test this hypothesis, we use the Current Population Survey to calculate the fraction of workers 
in each 2-digit SIC industry that receive income from unemployment insurance in each year the data are 
available – from 1988 through 2008.  We obtain industry rates of unemployment insurance usage by 
averaging across years, weighting by the number of observations to reduce sampling variance.  We then 
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separate industries into two groups based on whether the fraction of workers receiving UI income is 
above or below the sample median.  The results are presented in Table 10. 
Columns 3 and 4 indicate that the relation between unemployment insurance and corporate 
capital structure is stronger for industries with above median fractions of workers receiving payments 
from unemployment insurance.  In addition to any difference in layoff propensities, unemployed workers 
in these industries appear more likely to draw unemployment benefits when they become unemployed.  
Doubling the maximum total UI benefit is associated with a 4.1 percentage point increase in leverage and 
an 16.2 percent reduction in interest coverage for firms in these industries.  In contrast, the relation 
between UI benefits and firm financing decisions is smaller in industries with relatively few UI recipients 
(columns 7 and 8).  These findings offer further empirical support that the relation we find between UI 
benefits and financing decisions appears to result from firms using conservative financial policies to 
mitigate worker exposure to unemployment risk. 
 
4.5 Importance of firm financial constraints  
 The relation between UI generosity and firms’ financial policies should, in theory, also be 
stronger among financially constrained firms.  Workers’ concerns about job loss are likely to be 
heightened when firms are unable to raise external financing to buffer negative economic shocks, because 
many firms respond to performance declines by laying off workers (Ofek 1993, John, Lang, and Netter 
1992).  Increased unemployment risk due to financing frictions leads workers to require even higher wage 
premiums to stay at work and places strong pressure on firms to maintain conservative financial policies, 
but UI benefits can ease the pressure by reducing workers’ expected costs of unemployment.  To explore 
these implications, we groups firms based on indicators of financial constraints and examine the relation 
between UI benefits and corporate finance separately for each group.  The results are reported in Table 
11. 
We start by classifying firms based on their dividend policy.  There is a long tradition of using 
firms’ observed payout practices to identify financially vulnerable firms that are likely to face relatively 
high costs of external finance (Fazzari, Hurbbard, and Petersen 1988; Kaplan and Zingales 1997).  Firms 
that need to retain all of their capital are more likely to be financially constrained; their workers therefore 
face greater unemployment risk.   Among these firms, we find that the relation between the generosity of 
UI benefits and firms’ financial leverage is particulary strong: doubling the maximum total UI benefit is 
associated with a 5.0 percentage point increase in leverage (column 1) and a 28.9 percent decrease in 
interest coverage (column 2).  Firms that can afford to pay dividends, on the other hand, are less likely to 
be at risk of financial distress, and there is no discernable relationship between UI generosity and either 
measure of leverage among these firms (columns 5 and 6). 
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Similar results are obtained when we divide the sample based on other measures of financial 
vulnerability, such as operating cash flows.  Firms with low cash flows are potentially less able to pledge 
capital to outside investors, thus making it more difficult to raise external financing. We find that UI 
generosity is linked with greater leverage (column 3) and lower interest coverage (column 4) among firms 
with low cash flows; the relationship is weaker among high-cash flow firms, which are likely to be less 
prone to financial distress and are able to provide improved job security for workers (columns 7 and 8).  
Collectively, these findings suggest that firms facing tighter financing constraints are more likely to take 
worker unemployment costs into account when setting financial policy, as limited access to external 
financing exacerbates workers’ unemployment risk during difficult economic times.  These results further 
strengthen our conclusion that firms use conservative financial policies partly to mitigate worker exposure 
to unemployment risk.   
 
5 Alternative mechanisms 
5.1 Pure cash flow effect 
As described in Section 2, firms pay premiums for their workers’ unemployment insurance.  
When UI benefits increase, firms’ premium costs increase as well.  With less money to pay down debt, 
these additional costs could weaken firms’ financial positions, increasing leverage and reducing cash and 
corporate liquidity.  In this scenario, the observed relation between UI benefits and leverage may 
represent purely a cash flow effect of UI generosity and not a response to workers’ unemployment risk.  
UI generosity, therefore, may “mechanically” increase debt by reducing profits.   
It is not obvious, however, that UI benefits reduce a firm’s resources on net.  Although premium 
costs increase, workers require less compensation for unemployment risk in wages, benefits, or workplace 
amenities that are costly for the firm to provide.  In fact, if workers are risk averse and UI premiums are 
actuarially fair, then more generous unemployment benefits could make firms better off.  Thus, the impact 
of UI generosity on firm profitability is an empirical question. 
 We address this hypothesis in two ways.  First, the results reported above are robust to adding 
financial controls, including return on assets – a proxy for profitability (see column 2 of Tables 3 and 4).   
Although the controls are imperfect, the fact that the point estimates are unaffected by their inclusion 
suggests that the observed increases in leverage are not attributable to a mechanical cash flow effect.  
Second, we examine the impact of changes in UI benefit laws directly on accounting performance.  If 
increases in UI benefit laws cause firms’ costs to increase on net, their operating performance should 
decrease as profits are dissipated through higher UI premiums and related costs.  As reported in Table 6, 
the level of UI benefits has no significant relation to firms’ operating performance, and if anything, the 
point estimates suggest that increases in UI benefits may be associated with increases in operating 
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performance.  Thus both sets of evidence contradict the notion that UI benefits may affect financial policy 
through mechanical increases in firms’ costs. 
 
5.2 Strategic leverage 
Another possibility is that UI benefit laws affect financial policy by impacting workers’ outside 
options.  If greater unemployment insurance benefits raise the reservation utility of employed workers, 
then the wage bargaining position of workers could improve.  An optimizing firm may respond by raising 
leverage as means of maintaining a tougher bargaining stance with employees (Bronars and Deere 1991; 
Matsa 2010).  In this scenario, the financial policies associated with increases in UI benefits could reflect 
changes in the worker-firm bargaining environment rather than changes in workers’ unemployment risk. 
Unemployment insurance benefits, however, are unlikely to raise the reservation utility of 
employed workers.10
One such eligibility criterion, the work stoppage provision, permits strikers to collect 
unemployment benefits during a labor dispute if their employer continues to operate at or near normal 
levels.  In a sense, a work stoppage provision provides strikers with insurance for a failed strike, because 
it allows striking workers to collect benefits only if employers succeed in weathering the strike and 
continue to operate at or near normal levels.  Consistent with work stoppage provisions improving 
workers’ bargaining position, Hutchens, Lipsky, Stern (1989) find that their repeal is associated with less 
frequent strike activity in states with relatively generous unemployment insurance programs, and Matsa 
(2010) finds that firms respond to their repeal by reducing leverage. 
  An individual worker who refuses to work because his employer denied him a raise 
would almost always be ineligible for UI benefits.  One exception is for unionized employees in select 
states: while eligibility rules generally exclude striking workers from collecting UI benefits, many states 
allow those unemployed because of a labor dispute to collect unemployment insurance benefits under 
specific (but not usual) conditions. 
To evaluate whether the corporate financial policies associated with increases in UI benefits 
appear to reflect changes in the worker-firm bargaining environment, we repeat our analysis separately 
for industries with high and low union presence.  We classify industries based on the percentage of their 
workforce covered by collective bargaining agreements in 1983.11
                                                 
10 UI generosity naturally improves the reservation utility for unemployed workers who are eligible for 
benefits.  A large literature in labor economics finds that unemployment spells last longer when UI 
benefits are more generous (for examples, see Moffitt 1985; Meyer 1990; Katz and Meyer 1990; Card 
2004).  Longer unemployment spells may partly result from unemployed workers putting less effort into 
search, but may also partly result from workers being reluctant to take a new job unless the wages, 
benefits, and other amenities are adequate.   
  The results are reported in Table 12. 
11 Industries with at least 25 percent of workers covered by collective bargaining are classified as high 
union; industries with less than 25 percent are low union.  Data on union coverage is from Hirsch and 
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The strategic leverage hypothesis predicts that the relation between UI generosity and corporate 
financial policies should be concentrated among firms in highly unionized industries.  In contrast, we find 
the relationship between UI benefits and leverage to be, if anything, stronger among firms in low union 
industries.  Doubling the maximum total UI benefit is associated with a 4.3 percentage point increase in 
leverage and an 22.7 percent reduction in interest coverage in industries with low union coverage 
(columns 3 and 4).  The relations between UI benefits and firm financing are slightly smaller and 
statistically insignificant in industries with higher union coverage (columns 1 and 2).  These results are 
further reinforced by Hamermesh and Wolf (1990), who find that unionized workers do not receive larger 
compensating wage differentials for unemployment risk, presumably because unionization is not 
necessary for workers to receive compensatory wages in full.  We conclude that the connection between 
UI and leverage does not appear to be driven by worker bargaining. 
 
6. Overall importance of unemployment risk for leverage 
Our analysis thus far measures the impact of workers’ unemployment risk on firms’ capital 
structures using reduced-form estimates of the effects of exogenous changes in states’ UI benefit laws.  
Government insurance, however, only partially reduces a worker’s risk of unemployment.  UI typically 
replaces at most half of a worker’s wages (irrespective of state benefit ceilings), so even workers facing a 
generous UI system will still demand a modest wage premium for bearing residual unemployment risk.  
To provide a more comprehensive measure of unemployment risk’s effect on firms’ financing decisions, 
this section develops numerical estimates for the present value of excess labor costs associated with 
leverage choices.  These measures can be characterized as the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress 
related to worker unemployment risk.   
Labor unemployment risk primarily affects capital structure by raising firms’ wage costs as they 
increase financial leverage.  To estimate these costs, we use results from Altman (2007) to assess the 
default probabilities associated with each rating, and Topel (1984) for the increase in wages required to 
compensate workers for bearing a unit of unemployment risk.  For each credit rating, we calculate the 
additional labor costs required to compensate workers for their expected loss in utility should the firm 
default.  
For this calculation, the key missing information among existing estimates is the unemployment 
risk associated with financial distress.  We calculate the probability of being laid off conditional on 
default using data on bond defaults from 1977 to 2008, from the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Corporate 
                                                                                                                                                             
Macpherson (2003), based on a sample of employed wage and salary workers, ages 16 and over, from the 
Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files for 1983, and are matched to SIC 
industry classifications using U.S. Bureau of Census (1989). 
 24 
Bond Default Master Database.  For each default, we gather employment data for the issuer from 
Compustat, and calculate the percentage change in employment in a window from the one year before to 
one year after the default event.12
Among the 283 firms for which employment data are available in the immediate years around 
default, employment decreases by approximately 27 percent in the 2 years surrounding default.  On 
average, about half of the decrease occurs in the year before the default while the remainder occurs in the 
year after.  These estimates are lower bounds, however, because employment reductions are likely to be 
greater among firms that delist after default and are missing employment data in Compustat.  Of such 
firms, 31 enter bankruptcy. Hotchkiss (1995) finds that the median firm entering bankruptcy suffers a 50 
percent reduction in employment between the last fiscal year prior to bankruptcy and the first fiscal year 
after emerging.  Applying this estimate in our sample (and dropping the remaining firms with missing 
data), the average decrease in employment around default is 29 percent.  Alternative assumptions about 
employment changes for firms with missing data lead to similar overall measures of workforce 
adjustments around default.  
  For issuers with multiple defaults, we analyze employment changes 
around the first event.  The results are reported in Table 13, Panel A. 
To verify that our measures of employment change are related to financial distress rather than 
economic distress, we also examine the contemporaneous change in employment among other Compustat 
firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry as each defaulting issuer.  These industry-level employment 
changes capture average workforce adjustments related to economic distress under the assumption that 
economic distress affects all firms within an industry.  As reported in Panel A, the average industry 
employment change is +3 percent in the years surrounding default.13
When a firm increases leverage, it increases the probability of default and exposes workers to a 
greater probability of job loss.  Topel (1984) finds that, for every additional percentage point in 
unemployment risk, average equilibrium wages increase by 0.93 percent.  This effect is moderated by the 
unemployment insurance system; Topel estimates that compensating wage differentials would increase to 
  The estimates across various 
windows show little sign of economic distress causing layoffs among other firms.  The positive 
counterfactual employment growth among comparable firms suggests that we may even be 
underestimating employment changes related to financial distress. 
                                                 
12 Compustat data allows us to calculate net changes in employment around a default event.  If these firms 
are also hiring employees during the period, our estimates will understate the gross flow out of 
employment.  On the other hand, our estimates may be too high if some firms might have laid off workers 
even in the absence of distress. 
13 This measure is precisely estimated; using more narrow industry classifications yields similar albeit 
noisier results.  For example, restricting attention to firms in the same 4-digit SIC industry reveals an 
average contemporaneous employment change of 8% around default for sample firms.  
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2.5% in the absence of UI benefits.14 ω  The average value of the compensating wage premium, , per 
dollar of assets is then given by applying the average firm’s labor intensity and capitalizing the annual 
wage premium: 
pr
A
Lp
A D +
Π
=
υω
 
where p is the probability of default, υ  is the probability of unemployment conditional on default, Π is 
the per-unit required wage premium, L is labor expense, A is the market value of assets, and rD is the 
expected return on debt.15
Estimates of the compensating wage premium are presented in Panel B of Table 13.  Each row 
corresponds to a different credit rating.  While wage premiums among highly rated firms are minimal 
(e.g., about 4 basis points of firm value for a AA-rated firm), they are substantially larger among more 
highly leveraged firms.   For example, a BBB rating, which corresponds to a leverage ratio of about 0.33 
(see Molina (2005)), requires a firm to pay about 57 basis points of firm value in additional wages in the 
presence of UI, and about 154 basis points in the absence of UI compensation.   For a BB rating (leverage 
ratio of about 0.46), these figures jump to about 112 basis points with UI and 301 basis points without it.  
These estimates suggest that compensating wage premiums for unemployment risk can present substantial 
ex ante, indirect costs of increasing financial leverage.  
   
These estimates provide a lower bound, as our employment figures do not capture layoffs that 
that occur in financial distress in the absence of default.  Estimates of employment changes around 
default, reported in Panel A of Table 13, show that firms reduce employment by 15 percent in the year 
before a default.  Distressed firms that are able to avoid default likely reduce employment as well.  The 
full impact of distress related unemployment risk is, therefore, higher than these estimates imply.   
For comparison, we also present estimates of expected ex post costs of financial distress and 
marginal tax benefits as reported by Almeida and Philippon (2007, Table VI), based on estimates from 
Altman (1984), Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Graham (2000), Molina (2005), and their own analysis.16
                                                 
14 Using worker micro data from the Current Population Survey, Topel (1984) exploits differences in job 
loss rates across industries and regions to estimate the impact of unemployment risk on wages, controlling 
for demographic, industry, and policy-related factors.  
  
15 We use the historical default probability (Altman 2007) and spread over treasuries (Almeida and 
Philippon 2007) associated with each credit rating.  The average ratio of annual labor expenses to market 
value of assets in Compustat from 1950 through 2008 is 25.6 percent.  Following Almeida and Philippon 
(2007) and others, we assume the firm maintains a constant leverage ratio (and wage premium) until it 
defaults, at which point future wage premiums, distress costs, and tax shields are zero. 
16 We present these comparisons to help gauge the importance of unemployment risk relative to oft-cited 
measures of debt financing costs and benefits.  Other costs and benefits of leverage include considerations 
related to agency costs, asymmetric information, and stakeholder bargaining. 
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Using risk-neutral default probabilities, a BBB rating is associated with ex post financial distress costs of 
about 4.53% of firm value.  The tax benefits associated with a BBB rating are about 5.18% of firm value.  
The difference between estimated debt tax shields and ex post risk-adjusted costs of financial distress is 
about 0.65% percent of firm value.  For a BBB-rated firm, our estimates indicate that ex ante 
compensating wage premiums account for almost 90 percent of the difference between tax shields and ex 
post costs of financial distress (i.e., 0.57% of the 0.65% in firm value).   
These results show that the wage premium tied to unemployment risk associated with financial 
leverage represents a significant cost to shareholders.   Furthermore, the size of this compensation grows 
as firms increase leverage and reduce workers’ job security.  The estimates imply that labor 
unemployment risk is an important determinant of firms’ capital structures, particularly when 
government-provided unemployment insurance compensation is limited, leaving workers uninsured 
against costly layoff spells. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 This paper examines the impact of workers’ unemployment risk on corporate financing decisions.  
Exploiting variation in unemployment insurance benefit levels as shocks to worker unemployment costs, 
we find that reductions in labor unemployment risk are associated with increases in corporate leverage.  
Estimates indicate the average wage compensation for unemployment risk totals about 57 basis points of 
firm value for a BBB-rated firm.  The impact of unemployment risk is particularly strong for firms in 
industries where layoffs occur with high frequency, for firms that produce with greater labor intensity, 
and for sectors that employ workers with low wages and high UI utilization rates.  The relation between 
unemployment risk and financial policy is also stronger among firms facing tight financial constraints. 
The findings illustrate that firms choose conservative financial policies partly as a means of 
mitigating workers’ exposure to unemployment risk, supporting models such as Titman (1984) and Berk, 
Stanton, and Zechner (2010).  Reducing leverage decreases the probability that a firm will encounter 
financial distress and subject workers to costly layoffs.  By reducing leverage, managers are able to lower 
the wage bill required by workers as compensation for bearing unemployment risk.  More broadly, in 
contrast to standard assumptions in finance, the evidence suggests that labor market frictions are an 
important feature of the corporate environment.  Debt policy is but one of many ways for firms to 
mitigate workers’ unemployment risk.  Firms can also reduce the probability of distress by taking less 
risky projects, or reduce workers’ losses in distress by redesigning job tasks to require fewer firm-specific 
skills (Jaggia and Thakor 1994).  Exploring the implications of unemployment risk on additional 
corporate policies is an interesting area for future empirical research. 
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Figure 1. Cross-industry correlation between the layoff separation rate and market
leverage, 2008. The figure plots average market leverage in 2008 against the long-run average
layoff separation rate at the 2-digit NAICS level. Market leverage is total debt divided by the
market value of the firm, from Compustat. The layoff separation rate is the ratio of workers
affected by extended mass layoffs to total industry employment, based on data from the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics’s Mass Layoff Statistics and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The regression line shown is weighted based on the underlying number of firm observations. A
1 percentage point increase in the layoff separation rate is associated with 6.4 percentage point
decrease in market leverage.
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Figure 2. Relative increases in state maximum unemployment insurance benefits by decade, 1950–2009. The figure displays the
quartile of a state's increase in maximum total benefits, relative to other states in each decade from 1950 to 2009. Larger increases in
benefits are shown in darker shades. Maximum total benefits is the product of the statutory maximum weekly UI benefit and the maximum
duration, based on information from annual issues of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Significant Provisions of State UI Laws.
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Figure 3. Distribution of state increases in max unemployment insurance benefits over
each decade, 1950–2009. The figure plots the distribution of state increases in maximum total
benefits over each decade from 1950 to 2009. In total, there are 306 state-decade
observations, including the District of Columbia. Maximum total benefits is the product of the
statutory maximum weekly UI benefit and the maximum duration, based on information from
annual issues of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Significant Provisions of State UI Laws.
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Figure 4. Average market leverage and log max unemployment insurance benefits by
state, 1950–2008. The figure plots average annual state residuals from regressions market
leverage and log maximum total benefits on year fixed effects from 1950 to 2008. Results for
each of the 6 largest US states are reported.  Market leverage is total debt divided by the market 
value of the firm, from Compustat. Log max total benefits is the natural log of the product of the
statutory maximum weekly UI benefit and the maximum duration, based on information from
annual issues of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Significant Provisions of State UI Laws.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Mean
Standard 
deviation 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Total debt / Assets 0.292 0.254 0.072 0.230 0.460
Log interest coverage 1.875 1.449 0.839 1.805 2.653
Log max total benefit 8.554 0.629 8.171 8.679 8.972
Log max weekly benefit 5.283 0.625 4.905 5.412 5.704
Log max duration 3.271 0.048 3.258 3.258 3.258
Proportion of fixed assets 0.312 0.219 0.141 0.266 0.438
Log sales 4.423 2.284 2.991 4.440 5.966
Return on assets -0.003 0.397 0.015 0.086 0.141
Z-score 0.877 5.205 0.948 2.058 2.848
Market to book ratio 2.333 4.455 0.773 1.478 2.777
Unemployment rate 6.383 1.943 5.019 6.174 7.472
GDP growth 6.768 3.439 4.510 6.417 8.734
A. Dependent variables
B. Unemployment insurance variables
C. Control variables
The sample consists of 144,327 firm-year observations from 1950 through 2008. The unemployment
insurance (UI) benefit criteria are from annual issues of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Significant
Provisions of State UI Laws, the financial data are from Compustat, the state unemployment rates are
calculated from the Current Population Survey (available with complete state indicators starting in 1977),
and the state GDP growth rates are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The sample includes all
firms (excluding financials and utilities) with nonmissing observations for the variables shown below. The
leverage ratio is debt divided by the market value of assets. Log interest coverage is the natural log of 1
plus the ratio of operating earnings before depreciation to interest expense, where the variable is recoded
to zero for observations with negative earnings.  Compustat variables are winsorized at 1% tails.
Table 2. Unemployment Insurance Laws and Total State Benefit Payments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log max total benefit 0.891*** 0.896***
(0.128) (0.107)
Log max weekly benefit 1.009*** 1.009***
(0.131) (0.107)
Log max duration 0.484** 0.645**
(0.232) (0.251)
Unemployment rate 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.068***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
GDP growth -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.027***
-0.005 -0.005 -0.006
Observations 2,040 2,040 2,040 1,632 1,632 1,632
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.91
Fixed effects:
State X X X X X X
Year X X X X X X
Log state unemployment insurance compensation
The table summarizes the results from state-panel regressions of log state unemployment insurance (UI) compensation
on variables representing the generosity of state UI benefit criteria and a set of controls. Controls in all regressions
include state and year fixed effects. Where shown, controls also include the state unemployment rate and the state GDP
growth rate. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3. Unemployment Insurance Laws and Firms' Capital Structures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log max total benefit 0.041** 0.032** 0.030* 0.040** 0.017*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009)
Proportion of fixed assets 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.232*** 0.218***
-(0.011) -(0.011) -(0.012) -(0.014)
Log sales 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.030***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Return on assets -0.063*** -0.053*** -0.047*** -0.050***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Z-score -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.025***
-(0.001) (0.000) -(0.001) -(0.001)
Market to book ratio -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.004***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unemployment rate -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growth -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) 0.000
Observations 144,327 144,327 119,942 98,885 98,885
R-squared 0.60 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.66
Exclude dispersed industries X X
Book value X
Fixed effects:
Firm X X X X X
Year X X X X X
Total debt / Assets
The table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of total debt divided by the market
value of the firm (divided by book value in column 5) on the log maximum total potential benefit
available under the state’s unemployment insurance system, and a set of controls. Controls in all
regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Where shown, controls also include financial
controls (the proportion of fixed assets, the market-to-book ratio, log sales, modified Altman’s z-
score, and return on assets) and state economic indicators (state unemployment rate and the state
GDP growth rate). Where indicated, industries are excluded where a large percentage of the
workforce is likely to be geographically dispersed, namely retail, wholesale, and transport.
Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 4. Unemployment Insurance Laws and Firms' Interest Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log max total benefit -0.154*** -0.128*** -0.149*** -0.181***
(0.057) (0.047) (0.047) (0.058)
Proportion of fixed assets -0.826*** -0.843*** -0.887***
(0.073) (0.085) (0.095)
Log sales 0.113*** 0.124*** 0.138***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Return on assets 1.126*** 1.035*** 0.999***
(0.055) (0.047) (0.042)
Z-score 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Market to book ratio 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment rate 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.005)
GDP growth 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 144,327 144,327 119,942 98,885
R-squared 0.57 0.62 0.63 0.63
Exclude dispersed industries X
Fixed effects:
Firm X X X X
Year X X X X
Log interest coverage
The table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of log interest coverage on
the log maximum total potential benefit available under the state’s unemployment
insurance system, and a set of controls. Controls in all regressions include firm and year
fixed effects. Where shown, controls also include financial controls (the proportion of
fixed assets, the market-to-book ratio, log sales, modified Altman’s z-score, and return on
assets) and state economic indicators (state unemployment rate and the state GDP
growth rate). Where indicated, industries are excluded where a large percentage of the
workforce is likely to be geographically dispersed, namely retail, wholesale, and transport.
Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *** denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 5. Unemployment Insurance Laws and Firms' Capital Structures
Full sample
Sales data 
not missing
Interstate 
sales > 70%
Interstate 
sales > 75%
Interstate 
sales > 80%
Interstate 
sales > 85%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log max total benefit 0.040** 0.037* 0.041* 0.042** 0.042** 0.054***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018)
Observations 98,885 68,846 66,065 64,756 57,723 34,577
R-squared 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62
Log max total benefit -0.181*** -0.136** -0.160*** -0.164*** -0.177*** -0.304***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.065) (0.086)
Observations 98,885 68,846 66,065 64,756 57,723 34,577
R-squared 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.60
Financial controls X X X X X X
Fixed effects:
Firm X X X X X X
Year X X X X X X
Panel A. Total debt / Assets
Panel B. Log interest coverage
The table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage (total debt divided by
the market value of the firm or log interest coverage) on the log maximum total potential benefit available under
the state’s unemployment insurance system, and a set of controls. Each column corresponds to different
sample restrictions based on the geographic breakdown of sales in the firms' industry, specifically the percent
of the value of product shipments in the firm's 3-digit NAICS industry sent to destinations in a different U.S.
state, based on the 2007 Commodity Flow Survey. Controls in all regressions include firm and year fixed
effects, financial controls (the proportion of fixed assets, the market-to-book ratio, log sales, modified Altman’s
z-score, and return on assets), and state economic indicators (state unemployment rate and the state GDP
growth rate). Industries are excluded where a large percentage of the workforce is likely to be geographically
dispersed, namely retail, wholesale, and transport. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in
parentheses.   *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 6. Unemployment Insurance Laws and Firms' Operating Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log max total benefit 0.002 0.015 0.032 0.038
(0.022) (0.025) (0.036) (0.042)
Observations 144,327 144,327 119,942 98,885
R-squared 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.71
Financial controls X X X
Economic indicators X X
Exclude dispersed industries X
Fixed effects:
Firm X X X X
Year X X X X
Return on Assets
The table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of return on assets on the log
maximum total potential benefit available under the state’s unemployment insurance system,
and a set of controls. Controls in all regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Where
shown, controls also include financial controls (the proportion of fixed assets, the market-to-
book ratio, log sales, modified Altman’s z-score, and return on assets) and state economic
indicators (state unemployment rate and the state GDP growth rate). Where indicated,
industries are excluded where a large percentage of the workforce is likely to be
geographically dispersed, namely retail, wholesale, and transport. Standard errors, clustered
at the state level, are reported in parentheses. None of the reported estimates are
statistically significant at the 10% level.
Table 7. Falsification Test: Unemployment Insurance Laws in Bordering States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log max total benefit 0.040** 0.040** -0.181*** -0.182***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.058) (0.056)
Log max total benefit, 0.020 0.024 -0.015 -0.032
  bordering states median (0.023) (0.024) (0.111) (0.118)
Observations 98,885 98,754 98,754 98,885 98,754 98,754
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63
Financial controls X X X X X X
Economic indicators X X X X X X
Fixed effects:
Firm X X X X X X
Year X X X X X X
Total debt / Assets Log interest coverage
The table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage (total debt divided by the
market value of the firm or log interest coverage) on the log maximum total potential benefit available under the
state’s unemployment insurance (UI) system, the median log maximum total potential benefit available under the UI
systems in bordering states, and a set of controls. Controls in all regressions include firm and year fixed effects,
financial controls (the proportion of fixed assets, the market-to-book ratio, log sales, modified Altman’s z-score, and
return on assets), and state economic indicators (state unemployment rate and the state GDP growth rate).
Industries are excluded where a large percentage of the workforce is likely to be geographically dispersed, namely
retail, wholesale, and transport. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. ** and ***
denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 8. Unemployment Insurance Laws and Firms' Capital Structures -- Additional UI Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log max weekly benefit 0.042** -0.181***
(0.017) (0.064)
Log max duration 0.047 -0.328*
(0.076) (0.174)
Observations 98,885 98,885 98,885 98,885
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63
Financial controls X X X X
Economic indicators X X X X
Fixed effects:
Firm X X X X
Year X X X X
Total debt / Assets Log interest coverage
The table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage (total debt divided by
the market value of the firm or log interest coverage) on variables representing the generosity of states’
unemployment insurance system (the log maximum weekly benefit and the log maximum duration), and a set of
controls. Controls in all regressions include firm and year fixed effects, financial controls (the proportion of fixed
assets, the market-to-book ratio, log sales, modified Altman’s z-score, and return on assets), and state
economic indicators (state unemployment rate and the state GDP growth rate). Industries are excluded where
a large percentage of the workforce is likely to be geographically dispersed, namely retail, wholesale, and
transport. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total debt / Assets
Log interest 
coverage Total debt / Assets
Log interest 
coverage
Log max total benefit 0.041** -0.218*** 0.037** -0.200**
(0.020) (0.076) (0.017) (0.074)
Observations 52,103 52,103 57,613 57,613
R-squared 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.62
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Total debt / Assets
Log interest 
coverage Total debt / Assets
Log interest 
coverage
Log max total benefit 0.017 -0.042 0.018 -0.124
(0.022) (0.066) (0.021) (0.089)
Observations 53,873 53,873 60,566 60,566
R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.63
Financial controls X X X X
Economic indicators X X X X
Fixed effects:
Firm X X X X
Year X X X X
Low layoff separation rates Less labor intensive
Table 9. Unemployment Insurance Laws and Firms' Capital Structures -- Heterogeneity in Worker 
Unemployment Costs
Panel A. Industries with greater expected worker unemployment costs
High layoff separation rates
Panel B. Industries with lower expected worker unemployment costs
More labor intensive
The table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage (total debt divided by
the market value of the firm or log interest coverage) on the log maximum total potential benefit available under
the state’s unemployment insurance system, and a set of controls. Panel A restricts the sample to industries
with greater expected worker unemployment costs (above median layoff separation rate or labor intensity),
while Panel B restricts the sample to industries with lower expected worker unemployment costs (below median
for each variable). The layoff separation rate is the ratio of workers affected by extended mass layoffs to total
industry employment, based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’s Mass Layoff Statistics and the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Labor intensity is the ratio of labor and pension expense to sales, from
Compustat. For both variables, industries are defined at the 3-digit NAICS level. Controls in all regressions
include firm and year fixed effects, financial controls (the proportion of fixed assets, the market-to-book ratio,
log sales, modified Altman’s z-score, and return on assets), and state economic indicators (state unemployment
rate and the state GDP growth rate). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total debt / Assets
Log interest 
coverage Total debt / Assets
Log interest 
coverage
Log max total benefit 0.042** -0.181* 0.041** -0.162*
(0.017) (0.090) (0.020) (0.082)
Observations 46,163 46,163 57,767 57,767
R-squared 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.61
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Total debt / Assets
Log interest 
coverage Total debt / Assets
Log interest 
coverage
Log max total benefit 0.029 -0.122* 0.017 -0.097
(0.020) (0.069) (0.017) (0.072)
Observations 63,340 63,340 59,683 59,683
R-squared 0.62 0.61 0.66 0.64
Financial controls X X X X
Economic indicators X X X X
Fixed effects:
Firm X X X X
Year X X X X
Table 10. Unemployment Insurance Laws and Firms' Capital Structures -- Cross-industry Heterogeneity 
in Importance of Unemployment Insurance
Low UI payment rates
Panel A. Industries with greater UI payments and low wage workers
Panel B. Industries with lower UI payments and low wage workers
Fewer low wage workers
Many low wage workers High UI payment rates
The table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage (total debt divided by
the market value of the firm or log interest coverage) on the log maximum total potential benefit available under
the state’s unemployment insurance system, and a set of controls. Panel A restricts the sample to industries
with greater UI payments and more low wage workers (above median proportion of workers to collect UI
benefits, or proportion of workers earning less than $40,000 per year), while Panel B restricts the sample to
industries with lower UI payments and fewer low wage workers (below median for each variable). The
proportion of workers collecting unemployment insurance payments is from the Current Population Survey,
where industries are defined at the 2-digit SIC level. The proportion of low wage workers is from the 2000
U.S. Population Census, where industries are defined at the 3-digit NAICS level. Controls in all regressions
include firm and year fixed effects, financial controls (the proportion of fixed assets, the market-to-book ratio,
log sales, modified Altman’s z-score, and return on assets), and state economic indicators (state
unemployment rate and the state GDP growth rate). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 11. Unemployment Insurance Laws and Firms' Capital Structures -- Cross-firm Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total debt / 
Assets
Log interest 
coverage
Total debt / 
Assets
Log interest 
coverage
Log max total benefit 0.050** -0.289*** 0.040* -0.219**
(0.023) (0.092) (0.022) (0.081)
Observations 67,621 67,621 48,882 48,882
R-squared 0.65 0.60 0.67 0.57
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Total debt / 
Assets
Log interest 
coverage
Total debt / 
Assets
Log interest 
coverage
Log max total benefit 0.016 0.041 0.023 0.023
(0.011) (0.061) (0.015) (0.111)
Observations 31,180 31,180 48,876 48,876
R-squared 0.77 0.74 0.72 0.71
Financial controls X X X X
Economic indicators X X X X
Fixed effects:
Firm X X X X
Year X X X X
Positive dividends High cash flows (above median)
Panel A. Firms facing greater financial constraints
Zero dividends Low cash flows (below median)
Panel B. Firms facing fewer financial constraints
The table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage (total debt divided by
the market value of the firm or log interest coverage) on the log maximum total potential benefit available under
the state’s unemployment insurance system, and a set of controls. Panel A restricts the sample to firms facing
greater financial constraints (zero dividends or below median operating cash flows), while Panel B restricts the
sample to firms facing fewer financial constraints (positive dividends or above median operating cash flows).
Controls in all regressions include firm and year fixed effects, financial controls (the proportion of fixed assets,
the market-to-book ratio, log sales, modified Altman’s z-score, and return on assets), and state economic
indicators (state unemployment rate and the state GDP growth rate). Industries are excluded where a large
percentage of the workforce is likely to be geographically dispersed, namely retail, wholesale, and transport.
Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 12. Connection with Union Bargaining
Total debt / 
Assets
Log interest 
coverage
Total debt / 
Assets
Log interest 
coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log max total benefit 0.034 -0.115 0.043** -0.227***
(0.027) (0.098) (0.017) (0.081)
Observations 35,491 35,491 59,523 59,523
R-squared 0.62 0.60 0.64 0.63
Financial controls X X X X
Economic indicators X X X X
Exclude dispersed industries X X X X
Fixed effects:
Firm X X X X
Year X X X X
High union (coverage ≥ 25%) Low union (coverage < 25%)
The table summarizes the results from firm-panel regressions of firms’ financial leverage (total
debt divided by the market value of the firm or log interest coverage) on the log maximum total
potential benefit available under the state’s unemployment insurance system, and a set of
controls. Columns 1 and 2 restrict the sample to industries where at least 25 percent of the
workforce is covered by collective bargaining, while columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to
industries where fewer workers are covered. Data on union coverage is from Hirsch and
Macpherson (2003), based on a sample of employed wage and salary workers, ages 16 and
over, from the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group Earnings Files for 1983, and
are matched to SIC industry classifications using U.S. Bureau of Census (1989). Controls in all
regressions include firm and year fixed effects, financial controls (the proportion of fixed assets,
the market-to-book ratio, log sales, modified Altman’s z-score, and return on assets), and state
economic indicators (state unemployment rate and the state GDP growth rate). Industries are
excluded where a large percentage of the workforce is likely to be geographically dispersed,
namely retail, wholesale, and transport. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are reported
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Period (Years) Observations Mean Standard Error Min Max
I. Defaulting firms
[-1,+1] 283 -0.27 0.02 -0.30 -0.23
[-1,0] 362 -0.16 0.01 -0.19 -0.14
[0,+1] 286 -0.13 0.01 -0.16 -0.10
II. Rest of industry
[-1,+1] 283 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04
[-1,0] 362 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01
[0,+1] 286 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
Credit rating With UI Without UI
AAA 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.32 0.47
AA 0.04 0.05 0.13 1.84 2.51
A 0.05 0.06 0.16 3.84 4.40
BBB 0.53 0.57 1.54 4.53 5.18
BB 1.03 1.12 3.01 6.81 7.22
B 1.46 1.59 4.28 9.54 8.95
Costs of financial 
distress
Tax benefits 
of debt
Almeida and Philippon (2007)Wage Premium
Including bankruptciesExcluding 
bankruptcies
Table 13. Estimates of Compensation for Unemployment Risk by Credit Rating
Panel A. Employment Changes Around Default (percent of employment)
95% confidence interval
Panel B. Costs and Benefits of Leverage (percent of firm value)
The table presents estimates of the ex ante wage costs of firm leverage decisions. Panel A contains statistics
describing employment changes in various windows (measured in years) around default for firms in the Altman
NYU Salomon Center Corporate Bond Default Master Database (1977 to 2008). Industry (2-digit SIC)
employment changes around default (excluding the defaulting firm) are also reported. Panel B presents
estimates of wage premium, ω , as a percent of the market value of assets, A , required to compensate
workers for unemployment risk across various credit ratings, based on the following formula:
 
 
where p is the probability of default, υ is the probability of unemployment conditional on default, Π is the per-
unit required wage premium, L is labor expense, and r D is the expected return on debt. The first column
excludes employment changes for bankrupt firms in estimating p. The second and third columns assume a
50% reduction in employment for bankrupt firms for which employment data is unavailable. The second (third)
column presents average compensating wage premiums assuming mean (no) UI wage replacement. The
fourth and fifth columns present risk-adjusted ex post costs of financial distress and the tax benefits of debt for
each credit rating as reported by Almeida and Philippon (2007, Table VI). 
pr
A
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Industry NAICS
Layoff separation 
rate (percent)
Agriculture and forestry
Forestry and logging 113 0.8
Agriculture and forestry support activities 115 18.4
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction
Oil and gas extraction 211 0.3
Mining, except oil and gas 212 2.8
Support activities for mining 213 1.3
Utilities 221 0.5
Construction
Construction of buildings 236 1.2
Heavy and civil engineering construction 237 5.7
Specialty trade contractors 238 0.6
Manufacturing
Food manufacturing 311 4.4
Beverage and tobacco product manufacturing 312 2.1
Textile mills 313 3.7
Textile product mills 314 1.7
Apparel manufacturing 315 4.5
Leather and allied product manufacturing 316 4.4
Wood product manufacturing 321 1.9
Paper manufacturing 322 1.4
Printing and related support activities 323 0.8
Petroleum and coal products manufacturing 324 2.6
Chemical manufacturing 325 0.8
Plastics and rubber products manufacturing 326 1.3
Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 327 2.4
Primary metal manufacturing 331 3.0
Fabricated metal product manufacturing 332 0.9
Machinery manufacturing 333 1.6
Computer and electronic product manufacturing 334 2.3
Electrical equipment and appliance manufacturing 335 2.6
Transportation equipment 336 4.1
Furniture and related product manufacturing 337 1.6
Miscellaneous manufacturing 339 1.1
Retail trade
Motor vehicle and parts dealers 441 0.1
Furniture and home furnishings stores 442 0.4
Electronics and appliance stores 443 0.7
Building material and garden supply stores 444 0.5
Food and beverage stores 445 0.7
Health and personal care stores 446 0.2
Gasoline stations 447 0.1
Clothing and clothing accessories stores 448 0.4
Sporting goods, hobby, book and music stores 451 0.3
General merchandise stores 452 1.4
Miscellaneous store retailers 453 0.1
Nonstore retailers 454 1.0
Appendix Table A1. Layoff separation rates by 3-digit NAICS industry
This table lists layoff separation rates for three-digit NAICS industries. The layoff separation rate
is the ratio of workers affected by extended mass layoffs to total industry employment, based on
data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’s (BLS) Mass Layoff Statistics and the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis. Extended mass layoffs are defined by the BLS as when at least 50 initial
claims are filed against an establishment during a consecutive 5-week period and at least 50
workers have been separated from their jobs for more than 30 days.
Industry NAICS
Layoff separation 
rate (percent)
Transportation and warehousing
Air transportation 481 2.2
Water transportation 483 3.5
Truck transportation 484 0.4
Transit and ground passenger transportation 485 5.9
Pipeline transportation 486 2.7
Scenic and sightseeing transportation 487 2.1
Support activities for transportation 488 0.5
Couriers and messengers 492 0.7
Warehousing and storage 493 0.4
Information
Publishing industries, except Internet 511 0.5
Motion picture and sound recording industries 512 3.6
Broadcasting, except Internet 515 0.5
Telecommunications 517 0.9
Data processing, hosting and related services 518 0.7
Other information services 519 1.1
Finance and insurance
Credit intermediation and related activities 522 0.8
Securities, commodity contracts, investments 523 0.2
Insurance carriers and related activities 524 0.3
Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 525 0.3
Real estate and rental and leasing
Real estate 531 0.0
Rental and leasing services 532 0.2
Professional, scientific, and technical services 541 0.4
Management of companies and enterprises 551 0.2
Administrative and waste services
Administrative and support services 561 1.0
Waste management and remediation services 562 0.4
Educational services 611 0.1
Health Care and Social Assistance
Ambulatory health care services 621 0.1
Hospitals 622 0.2
Nursing and residential care facilities 623 0.1
Social assistance 624 0.7
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
Performing arts and spectator sports 711 0.8
Museums, historical sites, zoos, and parks 712 0.5
Amusement, gambling, and recreation 713 1.8
Accommodation and food services
Accommodation 721 1.2
Food services and drinking places 722 0.4
Other services, except public administration
Repair and maintenance 811 0.1
Personal and laundry services 812 0.1
Membership associations and organizations 813 0.2
Appendix Table A1. Layoff separation rates by 3-digit NAICS industry (cont.)
